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INTRODUCTION

Fifty years into the War on Poverty, the ability to fully participate
in American economic life is predicated on access to basic financial
services and mechanisms; yet, public programs designed to support the
economic advancement of people in poverty often explicitly exclude
intended beneficiaries from meaningful engagement with financial
institutions. To promote economic opportunity for families accessing
public assistance, we need policy reforms that both remove access
barriers and create entry points to the financial mainstream.
Safe and affordable financial products are foundational to financial
inclusion. Unbanked and "underbanked" households-the vast
majority of which are low-income---often rely on high-cost credit,
predatory loans, check cashing establishments, and other products or
processes that drain limited resources; this phenomenon is part of a
larger set of financial disadvantages often collectively referred to as
the "high costs of poverty."' Further, without any kind of formal
account structure or ongoing banking relationship with a financial
institution, it is far more difficult for these families to save securely.
Even small amounts of savings have been shown to play a critical role
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in helping families buffer against emergencies and avoid falling into a
debt trap. Similarly, even minimal savings can foster a "future
orientation" that allows families to look beyond immediate needs and
envision achieving long-term goals like higher education.
However, the policies governing our public assistance programs,
such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), have yet
to catch up to current financial realities. For example, in many states,
TANF maintains remarkably low (and administratively burdensome)
asset limits that have remained unchanged since the War on Poverty
began. Research shows that these limits not only discourage saving,
but also signal to TANF participants that simply owning a bank
account could be a liability. Furthermore, while the shift from paper
checks to Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards was a step in the
right direction in terms of access and security, few states both offer
and encourage direct deposit as a method of benefit disbursement,
despite its well-established consumer benefits. In short, current TANF
policy not only fails to support saving and financial inclusion, but
often actively discourages it.
Yet TANF has tremendous potential to serve as a vehicle for
promoting these goals. Despite current policy's shortcomings, at the
programmatic level, recent state and local innovations show how
incorporating principles of financial inclusion and asset building into
TANF delivery can help TANF-receiving families overcome barriers
to long-term economic security. Part I of this Article explores the
complex and varied reasons why so many low-income households, and
TANF households in particular, are unbanked. Part II examines the
statutory and administrative barriers to financial inclusion embedded
within TANF, such as low asset limits, high EBT fees, and underutilization of the direct deposit option. Part III highlights several state
and local efforts to connect TANF families with low-cost bank
accounts, savings incentives, and adequate consumer protections.
Lastly, Part IV offers recommendations for state and federal policy.
I. Low-INCOME FAMILIES AND THE FINANCIAL MAINSTREAM

The concepts of financial exclusion and inclusion emerged in the
1990s as geographers were observing the impact of bank closures on
physical access to banking services. 2 In a 1995 paper, researchers from
2
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the United Kingdom defined financial exclusion as "those processes
that serve to prevent certain social groups from gaining access to the
financial system." 3 Further, the authors explained, "rich areas tend to
get richer and poor areas poorer because of the way in which the
financial system discriminates between people and communities on the
basis of risk.", 4 Underlying this research was the hypothesis that
financial inclusion is essential to social inclusion and economic
development; as the authors concluded, applying a framework of
key to promoting a more accessible
"financial citizenship" could be
5
financial services marketplace.
During the same era, a growing body of research emerged
demonstrating the importance of assets for withstanding income
shocks, planning for the future, and maintaining household financial
security. In Assets and the Poor, Michael Sherraden drew upon these
principles to advocate for a new approach to welfare, which would
extend beyond facilitating immediate consumption through income
support to actively assisting families to develop savings and other
assets. 6 At the heart of Sherraden's theory was the idea of
inclusiveness and more equitable support for wealth-building; as he
wrote, "a new and more useful ideology of welfare would emphasize
participation by all citizens and the need for the nation to develop all
its people to the fullest extent possible."7 Further, demonstration
projects that arose out of Sherraden's work provided evidence for the
claim that even people with very low incomes can and do save, if8
provided access to appropriate savings mechanisms and incentives.
Together, the introduction of the idea of financial inclusion and the
asset building framework underscored the importance of connecting
more low-income households with the financial mainstream.
Yet over twenty years since these concepts emerged, financial
exclusion remains the norm for low-income families. Importantly,
financial inclusion does not refer simply to access to a bank account.
For purposes of this paper, I'll use the term broadly to refer to access
3 Andrew Leyshon & Nigel Thrift, Geographies of Financial Exclusion:
FinancialAbandonment in Britain and the United States, ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SOCIETY (1995), at 314.
4 Id. at 315.

IId. at 336.
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to a range of financial products and services, including low-cost credit,
that enable full economic capability and participation-and the
accompanying consumer protections that make access to these
products meaningful. 9
Nevertheless, even within this broader conception, access to safe
and affordable bank or credit union accounts is foundational. Yet
according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), nearly
10 million American households, or 8.2%, have neither a checking nor
a savings account; among households making less than $15,000 a year,
this figure rises to 28.2%.o An additional 20.1% of all households and
21.6% of households in this lower-income bracket are "underbanked,"
meaning they have a bank account, but regularly use alternative
financial services such as check cashers and payday lenders. And the
statistics are even more alarming for families participating in TANF; a
2006 study found that TANF households were 70% less likely than
other low-income families to have a bank account."
The reasons why many TANF households remained unbanked are
complex and varied. For some, perceived lack of need for a bank
account (i.e., lack of funds to deposit) is a key deterrent. In FY 2011,
only 17.6% of TANF families had non-TANF income. 12 For those
9 I have chosen to slightly broaden this definition beyond the initial conception
of the term because access to a bank account alone can still impose many of the same
costs, burdens, and risks as being unbanked if the account is accompanied by
significant fees or does not provide adequate remedies to have funds replaced in the
event of a loss. Similarly, the Center for Financial Inclusion defines "financial
inclusion" as: "A state in which all people who can use them have access to a full
suite of quality financial services, provided at affordable prices, in a convenient
manner, and with dignity for the clients. Financial services are delivered by a range
of providers, most of them private, and reach everyone who can use them, including
disabled, poor, rural, and other excluded populations." See Financial Inclusion
Glossary,
CTR.
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FIN.
INCLUSION,
http://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/publications-a-resources/financialinclusion-glossary.
10 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED
AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 5 (2012).
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families, the average amount was $725 a month. Similarly, only 10%
of TANF households had countable assets, with an average balance of
$220.13 In some states, income limits for TANF eligibility can be as
little as $215 monthly for a family of three, 14 while the average benefit
was only $392 per month in 2010.1"
However, beyond cash flow, these households also face an array of
structural barriers to safe and affordable banking. While some of these
barriers are common to low-income households more broadly, others
are embedded within TANF itself, as discussed in more detail in the
following section. Further, concerns about formal banking among lowincome consumers who are not receiving TANF are nevertheless often
informed by the normalization of financial surveillance in the public
assistance system. In other words, rules and policies within TANF
matter not only for their direct impact on participants, but also because
they have a "ripple effect"-and a related set of broader
implications-on low-income communities' perceptions of, and
relationships with, mainstream institutions.
A. Barriersto Bankingfor Low-Income Households
Many of the barriers TANF households face to getting banked are
common to many low-income consumers, regardless of whether they
are receiving public assistance. These barriers can be broadly
categorized into two types: formal and informal exclusion. By formal
exclusion, I am referring to financial institutions' policies that
explicitly prevent certain individuals from enrolling in accounts or
physically accessing services. By contrast, I am using the term
informal exclusion in reference to practices and policies that often
and/or
consumers
lower-income
burden
disproportionately
communicate to them that they are not the customers the bank is
seeking to serve.
1. Formal Exclusion: Inaccessible Bank Branches and Unaffordable
Accounts
One of the most straightforward explanations for low levels of
formal banking in many low-income neighborhoods is the
13 Id.
14 DAVID KASSABIAN ET AL., URBAN INST., WELFARE RULES DATABOOK:
STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2011 70
15 TANF RECIPIENTS, supra note 12.

(2012).

inaccessibility of appropriate accounts and services. Low-income
communities have long been underserved by traditional financial
institutions, with many neighborhoods lacking access to full-service
bank branches. 16 Some evidence indicates that this problem has only
worsened in the wake of the recession; since 2008, lenders have closed
nearly 2,000 bank branches, 93% of which were located in postal
codes with a median income below the national level of $52,762.17
Similarly, even when bank branches are accessible, the types of
accounts and services they offer may not be suitable or appealing for
lower-income consumers. For immigrant communities in particular,
language access and identification requirements may deter interaction
with mainstream financial institutions, particularly when alternative8
financial services often intentionally accommodate these concerns.'
More broadly, both checking and savings accounts often have a
minimum balance requirement of several hundred dollars; consumers
who cannot consistently meet this threshold are subject to monthly
fees. 19 In 2013, the average balance required to avoid fees for a noninterest-bearing checking account was $668, while average fees for
account maintenance rose to a record high of $5.54 per month. 20 Some
banks also condition free checking on a customer enrolling in direct
deposit of their paycheck or other regular payment, which can be a
particularly burdensome requirement for the unemployed.
Meanwhile, between 2009 and 2013, free checking decreased from
76% of checking accounts to 38%.2 1 Historically, "free" checking was
largely funded by overdraft or non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees
incurred by a small minority of customers-who
were

16

NAT'L CMTY. REINV. COAL., ARE BANKS ON THE MAP? AN ANALYSIS OF
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(2007),
available
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http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenterreports/ncrc%20bank%20branch%
20study.pdf.
17 Frank Bass & Dakin Campbell, Bank Branches Disappearfrom Poor
Neighborhoods like Longwood, Bronx, BUSINESSWEEK, May 9, 2013,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-09/bank-branches-disappear-frompoor-neighborhoods-like-longwood-bronx; see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Bank
Closings Tilt TowardPoorAreas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at B 1.
18 NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, LATINO ACCESS & FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN
CALIFORNIA (2013).
19
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ATTRACTIVE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS FOR LOWER-INCOME CONSUMERS (2011).
20 BANKRATE, 2013 CHECKING SURVEY (2013).
21

Id.

disproportionately lower-income, renters, and people of color.22 These
fees averaged around $35 each, and many banks permitted customers
to accumulate multiple-even unlimited-fees per day.
In 2009, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act (CARD Act), an amendment to Regulation E of the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, tightened overdraft service parameters
by requiring that accountholders opt in to overdraft coverage for ATM
and point-of-sale transactions, rather than being automatically
enrolled.23 These new rules went into effect in July 2010. For the
heaviest overdrafters who did not opt into the overdraft program, this
change resulted in average savings of $347 in reduced fees in the
second half of 2010.24
Though consumers clearly benefited, banks lost revenue as a result
of the new rules, and many elected to mitigate this loss by reducing or
eliminating free checking. 25 However, despite a decrease in the
proportion of customers enrolled in overdraft protection,
approximately 27% of accounts still experienced at least one overdraft
or NSF fee in 2011, and there remains considerable work to be done to
make ongoing overdraft policies less harmful for consumers. 26
Furthermore, according to the FDIC, in the second quarter of 2013,
U.S. commercial banks recorded a profit of $42.2 billion-an increase

22 See CHI CHI Wu, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RESTORING THE WISDOM OF

THE COMMON LAW: APPLYING THE HISTORICAL RULE AGAINST CONTRACTUAL
PENALTY DAMAGES TO BANK OVERDRAFT FEES 8 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2258704; LESLIE PARRISH, CTR.
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONSUMERS WANT INFORMED CHOICE ON OVERDRAFT
FEES
AND
BANKING
OPTIONS
3
(Apr.
16,
2008),

http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/final-caravansurvey-4-16-08.pdf.
12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(b) (2011).
24
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PROGRAMS 39 (2013) [hereinafter OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS].
25 Overdraft Rules Mean Consumers Will Pay Up, or Get

Out, FORBES, Feb.
23, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/thestreet/2012/02/23/overdraft-rules-meanconsumers-will-pay-up-or-get-out/. An additional influence on banks' decisions to
reduce or eliminate free checking was the so-called Durbin Amendment, a provision
of Dodd-Frank that limited the interchange or "swipe" fees that large banks could
charge for purchases by debit cards. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki et al., How To Help The
Unbanked? Repeal The Durbin Amendment, FORBES, Aug. 4, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/08/04/how-to-help-the-unbanked-repealthe-durbin-amendment/.
26 OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 24, at 4-5; see also WU, supra note 22.

of more than 22% in comparison to Q2 2012.27 In 2012 alone,
consumers still amassed over $32 billion in overdraft fees.28 In short,
the new overdraft rules were a major step forward for low-income
consumers-but this success was offset by banks' decisions to curtail
their provision of free accounts in response.
2. Formal Exclusion: ChexSystems and Credit Checks
A related institutional barrier to financial inclusion derives from
consumer-reporting agencies that share information about individuals'
banking history with client financial institutions seeking to assess their
creditworthiness, such as ChexSystems. ChexSystems compiles data
on "mishandled" checking and savings accounts, which banks use to
deny new customers accounts. A recent New York Times investigation
exposed the vast scope of the problem, finding that over one million
consumers have been denied bank accounts for "past errors" as minor
as a single bounced check. 29 Further, negative 3reports
can stay in a
0
database like ChexSystems for up to seven years.
In response to this widespread exclusion, some banks offer
"second chance" checking accounts for customers who are barred from
opening traditional accounts. However, few large, mainstream banks
offer these types of accounts, and they generally are accompanied by
significant fees and diminished functionalities since the customer is
perceived as a credit risk (for example, a consumer may be able to
open an account but will not be issued a debit card). 3 1 As a result,
ChexSystems remains one of the most significant barriers to bank
account ownership among low-income consumers.

27 Rich Smith, Here's Why It's So Hard to Get Free Checking Anymore-and
What

to

Do

About

It,

DAILYFINANCE,

Nov.

16,

2013,

http://www.dailyfinance.com/20 13/11/1 6/no-free-checking-avoid-bank-fees/.

28 Mary Beth Quirk, Here's Where Your Money Is Going:
Consumers Paid $32

Billion

In

Overdraft

Fees

Last

Year,

CONSUMERIST,

Apr.

3,

2013,

http://consumerist.com/2013/04/03/heres-where-your-money-is-going-consumerspaid-32-billion-in-overdraft-fees-last-year/.
29 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Over a Million are DeniedBank Accounts for Past
Errors,N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at Al.
30 Id.
31 Margaret Burnette, Bank Denied You for a Checking Account?, BANKRATE,
Sept. 24, 2012,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/denied-checkingaccount.aspx.

3. Informal Exclusion: Distrust of Banks and History of Surveillance
Finally, many low-income consumers, particularly those who have
had personal experience with public assistance of some kind, feel wary
of banks. A recent survey of recipients of CalWORKs, California's
TANF program, found that many preferred using cash or money orders
due to "bad experiences with using checks or automatic payments
from bank accounts," as well as the resulting overdraft fees. 32 As the
author summarized:
Past experiences with banks and credit unions have
left these men and women with strong, negative
feelings toward financial institutions and have led
them to construct financial
lives that avoid these
33
institutions altogether.
Many also felt that banks' fees were unreasonable 34and
unpredictable, and expressed a preference for greater transparency.
These experiences are borne out by the data. In 2011, according to
a study by the Consumer. Financial Protection Bureau, banks
involuntarily closed six percent of consumer checking accounts that
were open or opened that year-most often due to a negative balance
caused by an overdraft fee.3 Furthermore, evidence shows that many
banks have deliberately designed their overdraft programs to maximize
fees and mislead customers, while imposing financial penalties that are
often disproportionate to the banks' costs. 36 And overdraft penalties
are only one type of fee a customer can face; the average checking

32

ROURKE O'BRIEN, FILENE RESEARCH INST., "WE DON'T Do BANKS":

FINANCIAL LIVES OF FAMILIES ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 3 (2012) [hereinafter WE
DON'T Do BANKS].
33 id.
34 Recent critiques

of efforts to "bank" all lower-income consumers also
emphasize the different standards of customer service between mainstream banks
and check cashing establishments; see, e.g., Lisa J.Servon, The Real Reason the
Poor Go
Without Bank Accounts,
ATLANTIC,
Sept.
11,
2013,
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/09/why-poor-choose-go-without-bankaccounts/6783/ (arguing that many low-income consumers make a conscious,
informed choice to patronize check cashers due to closer relationships between
customers and tellers, as well as high fees at mainstream banks). This contrast may
be understood as another manifestation of "informal exclusion."
35 OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 24, at 5.
36 See WU, supra note 22, at 2-6.

account in 2013 had thirty different
fees attached to it, which many
37
banks failed to clearly disclose.
Additionally, some paiticipants in the CalWORKs survey
expressed concerns that all of their financial transactions were being
monitored.38 As discussed in more detail in Part II, programs like
SNAP, TANF, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and public
housing have long required applicants to surrender tremendous
amounts of personal and financial information as a condition of
eligibility. 39 And in addition to the financial requests, the process of
seeking public assistance often requires applicants to submit to
numerous additional intrusions-finger imaging, drug tests,
unannounced home visits 4 0-that communicate to applicants that
being poor equates to being suspicious.
The perception of being under constant surveillance, within a
system that is already notoriously difficult to navigate successfully,
leads many participants to be understandably reluctant to manage all of
their money through formal institutions that can be easily monitored. 4'
Further, even for low-income consumers who are not or are no longer
receiving any type of public assistance, initial and widespread
impressions of the mainstream financial marketplace, and their role
within it, may persist and deter future formal banking relationships.
B. Barriersto Banking within TANF
Beyond these barriers that affect many low-income households and
public assistance recipients more broadly, additional obstacles to
banking are entrenched within TANF itself, as discussed in more detail
in Part II. First, while some states offer direct deposit to a recipient's
bank account as a method of distributing TANF assistance, few
actively encourage direct deposit or establish it as the default method
37

Quentin Fottrell, The Hidden Fees Eating up your Bank Balance,

Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/averagechecking-account-has-30-fees-2013-08-08.
38 WE DON'T Do BANKS, supra note
32, at 6.
39 See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law,
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389 (2012).
40 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding that
requiring a
home visit by a caseworker as a condition of receiving AFDC does not violate the
Fourth Amendment); Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006)
(affirming Wyman's holding that home visits by caseworkers are not "searches," and
that even if they are, they are "reasonable").
41
See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 80-82 (2001).
MARKETWATCH,

of disbursement. This is a missed opportunity to leverage the public
assistance system to connect low-income consumers with the financial
mainstream or bolster their existing bafiking relationships. Further,
defaulting TANF consumers into an EBT card, even if they possess a
bank account, reinforces the message that the traditional banking
system is not designed to serve their needs.
Second, in nearly every state, applicants to TANF can become
ineligible for benefits if they exceed a very low level of allowable
savings, the amount of which they must demonstrate by providing
bank statements and other documentation of their available resources
at initial application and recertification.42 Qualitative studies have
shown that some TANF families are deterred from maintaining a bank
account because they fear that the account itself will make them
ineligible for assistance. 43 Similarly, research suggests that some
families who are eligible for public assistance nevertheless believe
they are ineligible due to their bank account.44
C. Consequences of FinancialMarginalization
Regardless of the particular reasons an individual does not have a
bank account, the consequences will likely be the same. Unbanked
households often rely on fringe financial services and high-cost credit
to pay bills and cash checks. The costs are significant, particularly for
families already struggling to make ends meet; unbanked families can
easily pay up to $15,000 over a lifetime in fees to check cashers and
42

Recertification commonly occurs every six to twelve months, but in some

states or for certain populations can be as frequently as every quarter. For a
discussion of how short and varying eligibility periods affect access to the social
safety net, see SHARON PARROTT & Liz SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, How STATES CAN ALIGN BENEFIT RENEWALS ACROSS PROGRAMS
OPTIONS FOR SIMPLIFYING AND ALIGNING ELIGIBILITY REVIEWS (2005),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-27-05prosim.pdf.
43 See Rourke O'Brien, Ineligible to Save? Asset Limits and the Savings
Behavior of Welfare Recipients, (New Am. Found., Working Paper, Nov. 2006)
[hereinafter Asset Limits].
44
See Jin Huang et al., Household Assets and Food Stamp Program
Participationamong Eligible Low-income Households (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working
Paper No. 10-28, 2010) (finding that bank account ownership, regardless of the
balance of the account, has a significant negative association with participation in
SNAP); see also SUSAN BARTLETT ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM ACCESS STUDY tbl. B-2 (2004) (finding that 73.8% of eligible nonparticipants in SNAP who believed they did not qualify for the program had bank
accounts, compared to 62.2% of those who believed they were eligible).

fringe bankers. 45 According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"[u]nbanked consumers spend approximately 2.5 to 3 percent of a
government benefits check and' between
4 percent and 5 percent of
6
payroll check just to cash them. A
In recent years, prepaid cards have emerged as a popular and
viable alternative for some unbanked consumers, 47 but currently
available cards vary widely in terms of fees, capabilities, and
consumer protections. According to a 2011 study from Consumers
Union, some cards would cost an average consumer over $600 a year
if they weren't vigilant about
avoiding fees, with overdraft charges
49
often being the most costly.
Moreover, without a bank account, families generally lack a safe
structure for savings. Even low levels of savings can significantly
increase a household's economic resilience by providing a buffer to
protect against emergencies and other unexpected expenses. Though
unbanked families may save informally, those with accounts are more
than twice as likely to hold50 savings and more likely to add to savings
on at least a monthly basis.
Further, even minimal savings have been found to help foster a
"future orientation" in the account holder, enabling him or her to think
beyond day-to-day survival. For example, children with dedicated
college savings accounts, regardless of the balance, are more likely to
45 Stegman & Faris, supra note 11, at
384.
46

Martha Perine Beard, Reaching the Unbanked and Underbanked, 20

CENTRAL

6

BANKER

(2010),

https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/pub-assets/pdf/cb/2010/CBwinter
O.pdf.
47 See, e.g., WE DON'T Do BANKS, supra note 32, at 5
(finding that some
CaIWORKs recipients found prepaid cards to be "easy to use [and] easy to
understand," particularly because of the transparent and predictable fees).
48 A "prepaid card" in this context refers to a reloadable prepaid
debit card,
which consumers can purchase for a small fee and deposit money onto by paying in
advance. For an analysis and critique of the current prepaid card market, see
Examining Issues in the Prepaid Card Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Inst. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,

112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Lauren K. Saunders, Managing Attorney, Nat'l
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Law

Ctr.),

available
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http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-

reports/testimony-senate-banking-prepaid.pdf.
SUZANNE MARTINDALE & MICHAEL MCCAULEY, CONSUMERS
UNION,
ADDING IT ALL UP: How PREPAID CARD FEES COMPARE TO CHECKING ACCOUNT
49

FEES (Apr. 4, 2011), http://defendyourdollars.org/pdf/Adding-It-All-Up.pdf.
50 Stegman & Faris, supra note 11, at 384 (citing ANNE KIM, PROGRESSIVE
POLICY INST., TAKING THE POOR INTO ACCOUNT: WHAT BANKS CAN Do To BETTER

SERVE Low-INCOME MARKETS (2001)).

develop a "college-bound identity." 5' Similarly, children with savings
accounts are six times more likely to attend college than their peers
without accounts, controlling for other factors.52 These findings about
savings' impacts on higher education correlate with the effect of assets
on economic mobility. For example, "someone with $10,000 in liquid
savings ... is 6.5 times more likely to have moved up and 5.5 times
more likely to have made it to at least the middle [income53quintile]
compared with someone with only $1,000 in liquid savings."
II. STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS TO FINANCIAL
INCLUSION WITHIN TANF

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program was
established by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996-commonly referred to as
"welfare reform." According to the legislation, the program has four
key purposes: 1) to provide assistance to needy families with children
so that they can live in their own homes or the homes of relatives; (2)
to end dependence of needy parents on government benefits through
work, job preparation, and marriage; (3) to reduce out-of-wedlock
to promote the formation and maintenance of
pregnancies; and (4)
54
families.
two-parent
TANF replaced Aid for Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), and made several key changes to its administration and
eligibility criteria. Most notably, PRWORA established TANF as a
block grant, rather than an entitlement, meaning that states would
receive a set amount of money each year according to a statutory
formula, rather than on the basis of need or in accordance with
macroeconomic conditions. As a result, states would no longer have
access to sufficient funding to provide assistance to any families that
met the program's eligibility criteria. States were also required to
supplement the federal grant with their own "maintenance of effort"
51 See, e.g., William Elliott et al., The Age Old Question, Which Comes First?
A Simultaneous Test of Children's Savings and Children's College-Bound Identity,
33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 1101 (2011).
52 WILLIAM ELLIOT III, NEW AM. FOUND. WHY POLICYMAKERS SHOULD CARE

ABOUT CHILDREN'S SAVINGS 7 (2012).
53 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, MOVING ON UP: WHY Do SOME AMERICANS
LEAVE THE BOTTOM OF THE ECONOMIC LADDER, BUT NOT OTHERS? 5 (2013),

http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2013/1 1/01 /MovingOnUppdf.pdf.

54 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 §
401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1997).

funds, at a level originally established by calculating 75% of each
state's 1994 AFDC spending."
Furthermore, compared to both AFDC and other contemporary
components of the safety net, TANF imposes a particularly lengthy list
of conditions to which participants must adhere to receive assistance.
Financial eligibility standards are very stringent, while benefit levels in
even the most generous states are below half the poverty level. 6
Participants are also subject to strict work requirements. To avoid a
reduction to their block grant, states must ensure that a certain
proportion of their caseload, as established by the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, is engaged in work-this is known as the "work
participation rate." 57 This requirement is typically thirty hours a week,
though states can adjust it to forty; for TANF recipients with children
under six, the requirement is twenty hours. For all families, the
majority of work hours must be spent in "core" activities, such as
subsidized employment or community service, while job search only
counts toward the work requirement for six weeks." The federal
lifetime limit on receipt of TANF is five years; however, many states
establish lower limits, which can be as little as two years.59
Indeed, a key feature of TANF is that the states have considerable
discretion in shaping their administration of the program. Compared to
AFDC, TANF is more of a federal funding stream than a federal
program. There is no federal requirement regarding the form of the
benefit that families receive; states are not obligated to distribute any
of their TANF grant in the form of cash assistance, although all
currently devote at least a portion of their funds toward this purpose.
However, since 1996, the proportion of families below the poverty line
that TANF serves has decreased dramatically; only 25% of families in
poverty received TANF assistance in 2012, compared to 68% in
55
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http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2002/4/welfare%20weaver/
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http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-21 -13tanf.pdf.
17 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2012). For an interesting discussion of
how TANF defines
"work," see Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (2006).
" 42 U.S.C. § 607(c).
59 Liz SCHOTT & LADONNA PAVETTI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
MANY STATES CUTTING TANF BENEFITS HARSHLY DESPITE HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT
AND UNPRECEDENTED NEED (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-19-
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to AFDC, far less of the TANF block grant
1996.60 Further, compared
61
assistance.
cash
to
goes
These two features of contemporary "welfare"-stringent
eligibility criteria and significant state policy discretion and
variation-have notable consequences for how participants in the
program relate to the financial mainstream. Importantly, states have
discretion to both determine their own financial eligibility criteria, as
well as the methods by which they distribute benefits. These choices
vary significantly and have meaningful implications for financial
inclusion.
A. FinancialEligibility:Asset Limits
Restrictions on the resources that public assistance recipients may
have are a part of the system that predates the War on Poverty. The
1955 Handbook of Public Assistance Administration established a
limit of $1,500 per individual AFDC recipient, which was increased to
$2,000 in 1966. 62 In 1975, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (later renamed the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)) promulgated a regulation that increased the limit to $2,250,
with a $1,200 vehicle exemption, but changed the relevant unit to the
household.63 However, in National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Mathews, the D.C. Circuit found the regulation invalid, because its use
of market value rather than equity value for evaluating resources
"violate[d] the cardinal principle of AFDC that only resources actually
available may be counted in determining whether the recipient is
within the state's definition of a standard of need. ' ' 64 Further, the court

60 FLOYD & SCHOTT, supra note
61

56, at 1.
The proportion of TANF spending devoted to cash assistance has also

declined markedly since PRWORA was enacted. See

CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
TANF 16 (Aug. 22, 2012) (finding that states used 29%
of TANF funds to pay basic assistance in 2011, compared to 79% in 1997).
62 Nat'l Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i)(A) (1974).
63 "The amount which may be reserved by an AFDC family of up to 4 persons,
other than the reasonable value of a home as determined by the State agency,
wedding and engagement rings, heirlooms, an automobile of a retail market value of
$1,200 or less ... shall not be in excess of a market value of $2,250." Coverage and
Conditions of Eligibility in Financial Assistance Programs, 40 Fed. Reg. 12,507
(Mar. 19, 1975).
64 Nat'l Welfare Rights Org., 533 F.2d at 649.
PRIORITIES, CHART BOOK:

held, the regulation "failed to articulate 65
factual determinations"
underlying the decisions about resource limits.
Following the decision, the Secretary revised the limit to $2,000 in
equity value, and established no limit on the maximum worth of an
automobile. 66 However, in 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), which decreased the asset limit
per household to $1,000 (as an upper limit), and established a vehicle
limit of $1,500 in equity value. 67 Prior to 1981, 32 states had exempted
the full value of one vehicle per household and were compelled to
reinstate a limit.68 Although several district courts declared the vehicle
restriction invalid, as discussed in more detail below, the federal
regulation establishing these limits stayed in place until PRWORA
created TANF and gave states the discretion
to establish their own
69
program.
the
for
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financial eligibility
As this history reveals, liquid asset limits in AFDC/TANF have
actually markedly decreased over the past six decades. The $1,500 per
recipient limit in 1955 would equal over $13,000 in the current
economy. 70 Today, TANF has among the lowest income and asset
limits of any means-tested program. In 2013, the median asset limit for
TANF was $2,000, while nine states continue to restrict TANF
families to no more than $1,000, nearly twenty years since the AFDC
era concluded. Unlike in SNAP, these limits are not indexed to
inflation by law. Although one district court found that failing to adjust
for inflation alone rendered the $1,500 vehicle limit "arbitrary and

65
66

id.
Falin v. Sullivan, 776 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Va. 1991). In fact, the

Secretary initially gave states the decision to use equity value or market value, but
published a correction notice in 1979 clarifying that only equity value was permitted
given established constructions of the phrase "available resources" in section
402(a)(7) of the Social Security Act., Ctr. on Soc. Welfare Policy & Law, Hew
Publishes CorrectionNotice Concerning Valuation of Resources in AFDC Program,
13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 92 (1979).
67 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2302,
95
Stat. 357 (1981); HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR., THE COST OF HUMAN NEGLECT:
AMERICA'S WELFARE FAILURE 84 (1982).
68 James X. Sullivan, Welfare Reform, Saving, and Vehicle Ownership:
Do
Asset Limits and Vehicle Exemptions Matter? 4 (Nat'l Poverty Ctr., Working Paper
No. 05-0741 May 2005).
69 However, some states used waivers to modify asset limits
in AFDC. Asset
Limits, supra note 43, at 2.
70
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).

capricious, ' 71 most courts have held that the HHS Secretary has broad
authority to establish eligibility rules as the Secretary 72sees fit-and
states have enjoyed similar latitude since welfare reform.
As a result, beyond being remarkably low, TANF asset limits are
also tremendously complex and oftentimes arbitrary. 73 States evaluate
dozens of different categories of resources, ranging from bank
accounts to Agent Orange settlement payments to retroactive, lump
sum benefits. Depending on the state, assets such as retirement and
education accounts, state tax refunds, life insurance policies, and
funeral agreements may or may not be included in the calculation. As
in AFDC pre-OBRA, most states now exclude at least one vehicle
from their TANF asset test, though a few maintain a vehicle equity
value limit (the difference between the retail value of the vehicle and
what the purchaser still owes on the loan), which may be as low as
$4,600. 74
The consequences for financial inclusion are often subtle but
significant. Most fundamentally, asset limits communicate to TANF
families that saving money-a behavior that is otherwise viewed as a
normative good-may warrant punishment. While higher income
In Hazard v. Sullivan, the court found that by failing to adjust for inflation,
"The regulation has now become a tool for denying applications, instead of the tool
for protecting self-sufficiency-by allowing receipt of benefits and possession of an
automobile-that it originally was intended to be." Hazard v. Sullivan, 827 F. Supp.
1348, 1352 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
72 See, e.g., Brown v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 46 F.3d 102, 107 (1st
Cir. 1995) (explaining that "OBRA delegates to the Secretary, and to no one else, the
unqualified authority to prescribe the amount of the automobile resource exemption
... Nowhere in the statute did Congress require the Secretary to ensure to all AFDC
recipients the right to a "safe and reliable" vehicle, or to pay special attention to the
other policy objectives urged by plaintiffs. Congress left it to the Secretary to decide
what policies should be given priority when figuring the exemption.").
3 Several district courts found the $1,500 vehicle limit to be "arbitrary and
capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act. Lamberton v. Shalala, 857 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding the limit "arbitrary and capricious" because the
Secretary over-relied on a single study, failed to consider intervening inflation, and
ignored congressional intent regarding self-sufficiency); see also Brown v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Serv., 46 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 1995) (overturning a district court
decision that had found the limit invalid based partly on failure to adjust for
inflation); We Who Care, Inc. v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 42 (D. Me. 1991) (finding
the limit invalid because the Secretary failed to provide sufficient information about
the survey upon which she made her decision about the $1500 level).
74 ALETA SPRAGUE & RACHEL BLACK, NEW AM. FOUND., STATE ASSET
LIMIT
REFORMS & IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY
5 (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/SpragueBlackFinal 10.31
•12_0.pdf.
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families benefit from substantial subsidies for building wealth,
delivered primarily through the tax code, 75 public policy actively
discourages lower-income families from building or maintaining
sufficient savings to cope with an emergency. This is a feature of the
system's design that perpetuates economic marginalization and
consequently undermines TANF's self-sufficiency and anti-poverty
goals.
The limitation on vehicle ownership is particularly damaging and
creates substantial barriers to sustainable employment, as several
courts have recognized. For example, although the district courts'
invalidations of the $1,500 vehicle limit were chiefly based on a
procedural issue in the promulgation of the regulation, several
opinions also noted how the restriction undermined AFDC's
objectives. In Lamberton v. Shalala, for example, the District Court of
Arizona found that the $1,500 AFDC limit "force[d] recipients to
acquire less reliable vehicles" and thus "prevent[ed] or hinder[ed] selfsufficiency in aid beneficiaries." 76 Similarly, in Hazardv. Sullivan, the
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found that the
vehicle limit had "become a tool for denying applications, instead of
the tool for protecting [the] self-sufficiency" AFDC was intended to
foster.
These intuitions are supported by empirical research; a 2006 study
found that moving from the $1,500 vehicle exemption to a full vehicle
exemption "increase[d] the probability of owning a car by 20
percentage points for low-educated single mothers relative to a
comparison group." 78 Today's lowest TANF vehicle limit, $4,600, is
almost as restrictive as the. $1,500 limit in 1981, which would be
$3,844 if adjusted for inflation. 79 Like the AFDC limit, this restriction
75 See, e.g., REID CRAMER, RACHEL BLACK & JUSTIN KING, NEW AM. FOUND.,
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2012),
(Apr.
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http://assets.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/AssetsReport2012
.pdf.
76 Lamberton v. Shalala, 857 F. Supp. 1349, 1354 (D. Ariz. 1994).
77 Hazard v. Sullivan, 827 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
71 Sullivan, supra note 68, at 2.
79 For current state vehicle asset limits in SNAP and TANF, see Lifting Asset
Limits in Public Benefit Programs, CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV. (Jan. 2014),
available at http://scorecard.assetsandopportunity.org/2014/measure/lifting-asset-

limits-in-public-benefit-programs. In the Food Stamp Program, the vehicle limit in
1979 was $4,500, and was found to exclude approximately 1.8 million individuals
from eligibility. See MICHAEL F. SHEEHAN & ROGER D. COLTON, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE HHS RULE ELIMINATING AFDC BENEFITS TO FAMILIES WITH

creates a barrier to work and "forces single parents or recently
unemployed parents into making what would otherwise be an
irrational and uneconomic decision." 80 More long-term, policies that
discourage vehicle ownership can prevent families from moving to
safer or more affordable neighborhoods and create barriers to
accessing medical care, better schools, or quality grocery stores. The
negative impacts are therefore not simply immediate, but potentially
multi-generational.
Finally, and most importantly for the focus of this paper, asset
limits can deter TANF households from maintaining bank accounts or
saving in formal structures. Previous studies have found that
AFDC/TANF families fear that "the welfare computers know more
about [their] finances than they themselves," and that keeping funds in
a bank account, even with only a minimal balance, may subject a
household to heightened scrutiny and risk of losing eligibility. 8 1 As
one TANF recipient explained in a 2006 study, "[h]aving money in a
bank account makes a big difference. If I had a bank account, and they
knew how much I had in it, I know that would change what they give
me. 82 By both forbidding savings and deterring TANF households
from even accessing the basic structures for managing their money,
asset limits eliminate pathways that families and individuals could use
to move toward sustainable self-sufficiency. In other words, asset
limits compel a trade-off between short-term needs and long-term
security that requires (or at the very least influences) individuals to
make financial decisions against their best interest.
In recent years, in recognition that asset limits create a tremendous
administrative burden while deterring responsible financial behavior,
an increasing number of states have begun to take advantage of their
flexibility to raise or eliminate their TANF asset limits under
PRWORA. Thus, while the courts have granted wide latitude to HHS
to establish financial criteria for the program, state agencies
themselves are increasingly acknowledging the tension between
restrictive asset limits and their programmatic goals. States vary in
their methods for implementing asset limit reforms: some are
accomplished through administrative processes, while others require
legislative changes. In 1997, Ohio became the first state to eliminate
VEHICLE ASSETS OVER $1,500
11-13 (1994),
available at
http://www.fsconline.com/downloads/Papers/1994%2012%20autoasst.pdf.
80 SHEEHAN & COLTON, supra note 79, at 7-8.
8 GILLIOM, supra note 41, at 80-81; see also Asset Limits, supra note 43, at 6.
82 Asset Limits, supra note
43, at 6.
MOTOR

its TANF asset limit, and since then seven other states have followed,
including six since 2009. 83 At the same time, in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamps), 36 states and
D.C. have eliminated their asset limits, while another five have
substantially raised them over the $2,000 limit, using a state policy
option known as broad-based categorical eligibility. There has also
been reform at the federal level; the 2008 Farm Bill exempted
retirement and college savings accounts, including 529s, from
consideration for SNAP eligibility.84
Though these state-level changes are promising, because they
evidence that policymakers are realizing the incoherence of a system
aimed at encouraging self-sufficiency that simultaneously blocks the
means through which people can become self-sufficient, this
piecemeal approach to reform will have a limited impact for several
reasons. First, simply carving out additional exemptions adds
complexity to the administration of these programs, and participants
are unlikely to be aware of such specific and technical modifications to
the resource limits. 85 Furthermore, in the specific case of 529 college
savings accounts and other tax-preferred savings vehicles, very few
low-income families are using these vehicles to save, since most do
not have tax liability and are therefore unlikely to reap the benefits of
the tax-preferred structure. 86 Second, since many households
participate in more than one assistance program, eliminating the asset
limit in one program or one state will not affect many families' actual
ability to save. Finally, having a patchwork of restrictions that vary
significantly across states and programs does little to dispel the
longstanding notion that accessing public assistance and building or
maintaining savings are mutually exclusive. Without more
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(H.B. 868) eliminated their TANF asset limits in 2013.
84 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4104,
122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
85

See Asset Limits, supra note 43, at 6-7 (finding that even in a state where the

TANF asset limit had been eliminated, some applicants still feared a bank account
could jeopardize their eligibility, while others estimated that the limit was as little as
a few hundred dollars).
86
See, e.g., RACHEL BLACK & MARK HUELSMAN, NEW AM. FOUND.,
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2012),

available
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comprehensive reform, asset limits will continue to relegate public
assistance households to the margins of the financial system.
B. Benefit Delivery Options
A second way in which TANF can constrict financial inclusion is
through state policy choices about the disbursement of assistance.
Within the past few decades, the public assistance system has become
increasingly digitized. The shift from paper checks and coupons to
more technological platforms has yielded benefits for both states and
consumers. Nevertheless, these new delivery mechanisms present their
own shortcomings, which have significant implications for families'
ability to access and use their benefits at minimal cost.
Today, states disburse their TANF assistance through a range of
different methods: branded electronic payment cards (EPC), such as
the EPPICard; direct deposit to a checking account or privately
selected prepaid card; Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards; and,
rarely, traditional checks. Each of these options is accompanied by
varying degrees of fees, functionality, and consumer protections.
- Accordingly, states' legislative and administrative choices about which
of these methods to select as the "default" can have widespread and
substantial consequences for financial inclusion. Further, the
significant impact of these policy choices underscores the untapped
potential of TANF delivery as a mechanism for connecting lowincome families with the financial mainstream.
1. Electronic Benefit Transfer
The USDA initiated the first EBT pilot project in 1983, delivering
food stamps via electronic payment to recipients in Reading,
Pennsylvania. 87 Though the demonstration was initially more
expensive than paper delivery, EBT's "popularity among benefit
recipients and merchants, coupled with its cost-saving potential," laid
the groundwork for experiments with other types of benefits, and
Congress's endorsement of EBT as an alternative to paper coupons in
the food stamp program in 1990.81
87
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(Dec. 2003), available at http://ccc.sites.unc.edu/files/2013/05/StateofEBT.pdf.
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Id.; Food Stamp Program, Regulatory Review: Electronic Benefit Transfer

(EBT) Provisions of the PRWOR Act of 1996, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,763 (May 27, 1999).

In 1996, PRWORA required all states to implement EBT for their
food stamp programs by October 1, 2002.9 In the interim, to curb
administrative costs, many states explored using the same
infrastructure to deliver other benefits, including TANF, general
assistance (GA), SSI, and refugee assistance. 90 Today, all but 11 states
91
use EBT cards as a primary method of distributing TANF assistance.
For states, the initial impacts of the shift to EBT were mixed, but
largely positive. Some states reported that transitioning to EBT
reduced administrative costs across the board. However, in others,
such as Maryland, the cost per case month (CPCM) for food stamps
declined markedly, while for AFDC (TANF's predecessor) and other
non-food stamp programs the administrative costs rose (though the
state still experienced a slight net decrease in costs). 9 2 One reason for
this is that the ATM and point-of-sale
(POS) networks that EBT
93
transactions rely on imposed new costs.
For consumers, the introduction of EBT had significant advantages
over paper checks (for TANF) or coupons (for SNAP). 94 Unlike
checks, assistance disbursed via EBT was less likely to be lost or
stolen, and recipients no longer had to wait several days for their
checks to arrive in the mail or spend additional time (and money,
particularly for those who do not have bank accounts at a financial
institution) to cash them once they arrived. For participants in the food
stamp program, the shift to EBT cards reduced stigma in the check-out
line. EBT cards work just like debit cards, with consumers swiping the
card and entering a PIN at a POS terminal at the cash register to make
a purchase. 95 At larger retailers, customers using TANF also often
have the option of getting cash back via POS transactions.
89
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90 STEGMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 7-9.
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supra note 87, at 15. A USDA evaluation of Maryland's

EBT program found that its CPCM decreased from $3.89 to $3.85 when it began
delivering food stamps, AFDC and two other benefits via EBT, for a total annual
savings of $120,000 in 1993 dollars.

Id.

See, e.g., Stegman & Fars, supra note 11, for evaluations of SNAP
participants'
generally positive experiences with the transition to EBT.
9
There are two types of EBT cards: magnetic stripe cards that store a limited
94

amount of data about the cardholder and connect to a central database through

Still, for TANF families, EBT also has its disadvantages. First,
EBT cards have limited functionality. Not all ATMs accept EBT cards,
and as discussed infra, the number of EBT-accessible ATMs is further
diminishing due to federal restrictions. Some states have also moved to
restrict the use of their EBT cards in other states. 96 Furthermore, EBT
cards cannot generally be used for online bill-paying, and provide no
mechanism for saving. Lastly, when TANF recipients no longer
qualify for assistance, their EBT card is useless as a debit card; it
cannot be reloaded. In other words, EBT cards are designed only to
serve short-term needs, and do nothing to increase users' long-term
financial capabilities or support their transition off of assistance.
Second, EBT cards are explicitly exempted from a range of
consumer protections established for other types of electronic
payments by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA). EFTA, which
was enacted by the Federal Reserve's Regulation E in 1980, gives
consumers critical protections concerning electronic transfers of
money, including protection against liability due to loss, theft, and
unauthorized charges; dispute rights in the case of errors; a right to
account information, including transaction history and balances;
disclosure of terms and conditions and fees; a ban on credit
conditioned on mandatory electronic repayment; and protection
from
97
overdraft programs imposed without consumer consent.
In March 1994, EFTA was amended to extend to EBT cards, based
on the reasoning that "all consumers using EFT services should
receive substantially the same protection under the EFTA and
Regulation E." 98 Yet just two years later, PRWORA reversed this
decision, amending EFTA yet again to exclude EBT protection in
response to "the urging of state and local officials, who expressed
concern about the costs of compliance with the EFTA and Regulation
E. In particular, these officials believed that federal provisions limiting
a recipient's liability for unauthorized transfers could raise serious
budgetary problems at the state and local level." 99 As a result, today,
telephone lines, or "smart" cards that store account information on a microchip
embedded directly in the card.
96 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 256.987 (2013) (restricting use of EBT cards to
access TANF assistance outside of Minnesota and bordering states). For SNAP,
restricting EBT access from one state to the next is prohibited by the Electronic
Benefit Transfer Interoperability and Portability Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-171, § 3,
114 Stat. 3 (2000).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2010).
98 Electronic Fund Transfers, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,467 (Aug. 14, 1997).
'9Id. at 43,467-43,468.

policies regarding consumer protection for EBT cards vary across
states, and states must take proactive measures to extend safeguards to
their public assistance households that are equivalent to those enjoyed
by consumers primarily accessing private financial services. Advocacy
groups have urged federal lawmakers to extend EFTA's protections
to means-tested benefits, which was one objective of the Benefit Card
Fairness Act introduced in the House in 2010-but the so-called "EBT
exemption" remains.100
Finally, accessing TANF funds via EBT often subjects participants
to significant ATM fees and surcharges. There are two types of costs
that typically accompany accessing cash assistance via an ATM. The
first is a transaction fee levied by the EBT contractor, which is paid
either by the state or directly by TANF households. Many states
subsidize a limited number of free withdrawals per month, though
withdrawals after that can cost between forty cents and $1.75 each.' 0 '
Additional fees may apply for checking the account balance at an
ATM. The more substantial costs often come from the surcharges
levied by out-of-network ATMs. In California, for example, these
surcharges can amount to as much as $4.00 per transaction.' 0 2 These
costs add up quickly. In 2011, EBT cardholders in California paid over
$20 million in fees and surcharges to access their assistance, 10 3 while
the state's TANF benefits averaged $460 a month per family.' 0 4 In San
Francisco County, this
translated into over $81 in fees and surcharges
05
per EBT household.1
In February 2012, Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief
and Job Creation Act of 2012, which made several important changes
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101 On average, states permit two transaction fee-free withdrawals per month.
However, some states do not permit any. Memorandum from Ctr. for Law and Soc.
Policy to the Dep't. of Health & Human Serv. to U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Serv. (June 11, 2012), http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication1/CLASP-comments-to-HHS-on-EBT-blocking.pdf.
102 EBT Surcharge-Free ATMs, CAL. OFFICE OF SYS. INTEGRATION
(Sept.
2014), http://www.ebtproject.ca.gov/Library/CashAccess.pdf.
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to the accessibility of TANF assistance.106 First, section 4004 of the
Act required states to "maintain policies and practices as necessary to
prevent assistance . . . from being used in any electronic benefit
transfer transaction in" liquor stores, casinos, or adult entertainment
establishments.' 0 7 This reform represented "the first federal TANF
provision to legislate how and where TANF recipients receive their
basic needs grants."' 10 8 States were required to be in full compliance
with this provision0by
February 22, 2014, or risk losing five percent of
9
grant.'
their TANF
However, interpretation of the requirements and methods of
implementation represent significant variation across the states. The
Center on Law and Social Policy (CLASP) has identified three
primary approaches for implementing the ATM restrictions: a
centralized approach, wherein the state identifies and disables all
ATMs in restricted locations; a retailer approach, in which the burden
is on the listed establishments to restrict EBT access at their ATMs;
and a consumer approach, in which individual consumers using EBT0
cards are responsible for avoiding ATMs at prohibited locations."1
States' experiences thus far demonstrate how each of these methods
creates its own burdens, liabilities, and costs. In California, for
example, which employed the centralized approach, the Department of
Social Services manually identified and reviewed 55,000 ATMs,
which required a significant commitment of staff resources."' Over
6,500 ATMs were ultimately disabled for EBT use.
However, as CLASP notes, the consumer prohibition, which is in
effect in at least seven states, is particularly troubling for two primary
reasons: first, because "it is difficult to imagine how a use ban could
be systematically enforced in a non-stigmatizing and nondiscriminatory manner," and second, because it puts clients at risk of
106

Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96,

§ 4004, 126 Stat. 156 (2012).
107 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(12)(A) (2012).
108 TANF Extended with New Provisionsfor Access and Fees, W. CTR. ON

LAW

&
POVERTY
(Mar.
7,
2012),
http://www.wclp.org/Resources/WC LPContent/tabid/1088/smid/3 613/Articleld/896/
Default.aspx [hereinafter TANF Extended].
'09 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(16)(A) (2012).
110 Memorandum from Ctr. for Law and Social Policy, supra note 101.
111See TANF Extended, supra note 108; see also Comment on Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families: Assistance and
Electronic Benefit Transfer Transactions, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,667 (Apr. 25, 2012), Todd
R.
Bland,
Cal.
Dep't
of
Soc.
Serv.
(June
8,
2012),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ACF-2012-0002-0016.

sanctioning or even prosecution for an "inadvertent error." Further, the
details of the access restrictions vary by state, with some, for example,
relying on more technical definitions of what constitutes a "liquor
store," while others have expanded the restrictions beyond the
federally listed establishments to include businesses like tattoo parlors
and jewelry stores. And even more fundamentally, as many critics of
the law have pointed out, many consumers who withdraw cash at a
particular ATM are not spending their money within the same
establishment. In some neighborhoods, and particularly in more rural
areas and on tribal lands, the closest ATM may simply be one that is
located in a prohibited location.
Finally, there may be broader implications for financial inclusion
beyond a reduced ATM network. Due to the breadth of the language
establishing the restriction, at least one state, Arizona, has eliminated
its longstanding direct deposit option, citing the impossibility of
monitoring TANF withdrawals from private bank accounts. 112 As
discussed in the following section, direct deposit confers many
advantages for TANF households. Arizona's revision of its policy
required converting 1,700 households from the direct deposit option to
an EBT card." 3
Second, ostensibly to balance out the restrictions to access, the Act
required states to make revisions to their TANF State Plans to:
[e]nsure that recipients of assistance provided under
the State program funded under this part have access
to using or withdrawing assistance with minimal fees
or charges, including an opportunity to access
assistance with no fee or charges, and are provided
information on applicable fees and surcharges that
apply to electronic fund transactions involving the
assistance, and that such information is made publicly
available. 114

112 ARIZ. FAMILY ASSISTANCE ADMIN., Arizona FAA Policy Manual, FB 13-13

(03-08-13)-CA Direct Deposit Option Discontinued (Mar.
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113 Interview with Arizona TANF Adm'r (Jan. 15, 2014).
114 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(viii) (2014).
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2013),

Again, the ambiguity of this language gives states significant
discretion to determine what qualifies as "access" or "minimal fees or
charges." Arizona, for example, considers its current policies to
provide adequate access to assistance, even though recipients do not
get any free ATM transactions.15 The state encourages its TANF
consumers to get cash back from a POS transaction at a large store to
avoid fees and charges, but there is no fee-free option at an ATM.
At the time of this writing, the Department of Health and Human
Services had issued only minimal guidance, in the form of frequently
asked questions, for interpreting and implementing the new TANF
rules." 6 In February 2014, HHS published a notice of proposed
rulemaking and solicited comments on the feasibility of implementing
section 4004's restrictions."17 However, while questions remain about
the EBT blocking requirements, the new law also presents an
opportunity for establishing stronger standards that give consumers
better opportunities to access their cash grants at minimal cost, thereby
preserving TANF funds for their intended purpose. The final section
will discuss this important potential in more detail.
2. Direct Deposit
Another option for delivering TANF assistance is direct deposit to
an account at the recipient's bank or credit union (or, in some cases, to
a privately selected prepaid card). Direct deposit confers numerous
advantages: recipients do not have to spend extra time or money to
cash their checks, there are no transaction fees for withdrawing funds,
and recipients will generally have access to a wider ATM network. By
nature of having a bank account, consumers also receive regular
statements of their transaction history, have the ability to pay bills and
make purchases online, benefit from federal consumer protections, and
can deposit other funds or build savings in a safe structure. Finally,
when a family transitions off of TANF, the account where they have

115
116
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Feb. 6, 2014).
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been receiving deposits remains available for direct deposit of a
paycheck and a range of other financial purposes.
Some states have also reported that direct deposit incurs lower
administrative costs than EBT. Arizona, for example, has a tiered
pricing schedule for their EBT contract, through which SNAP-only
EBT households cost less for the state than SNAP and TANF EBT
households. As one Arizona administrator described, prior to the
decision to end the direct deposit option, it was "cheaper for the state
to get as many on direct deposit as possible."" 8 This account aligns
with previous research; as of 2003, "under many state EBT contracts,
vendors [were] paid a lower fee (or CPCM-cost per case month) for
clients who receive cash benefits via direct deposit than for those who
receive benefits via EBT."1 9 In the same year in Missouri, each direct
deposit case cost ten cents to maintain, compared to fifty-eight cents
for each EBT case.120 Similarly, under New York's most recent, nineyear EBT contract, the CPCM of direct deposit was twenty-two cents
per TANF case, while the EBT option ranged from sixty-seven to
ninety cents, depending on the size of the overall caseload.' 2 1
However, despite direct deposit's advantages, it is not an option in
every state-and in states where it is available, the take-up rate tends
to be quite low. Only a few states actively encourage TANF applicants
to select direct deposit or122establish direct deposit as the default method
of disbursing assistance.

"8 Interview with Arizona TANF Adm'r, supra note 115.
"' STEGMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 11.
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122 Vermont, for example, requires TANF families with bank accounts to
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FAMILIES, ECON. SERV. Div., ALL PROGRAM RULES (2012).

TANF Households by Disbursement Method
% EBT
State
n/a
Oklahoma
Minnesota
86%
n/a
Virginia
Wisconsin
n/a
n/a
Iowa
California
96.2%
Illinois
unavailable
Colorado
99.3%
Source: Survey of Select States

% Direct Deposit
3%
- 7%
Unavailable
16%
4%
3.3%
0.2%
0.7%
by Author, 2014.

% Other
97% (EPPICard)
7% (checks)
92% (EPPICard)
84% (checks)
4% (checks); 92% (EPC)
.5% (checks)
unavailable
n/a

Furthermore, although direct deposit generally provides consumers
with easier and less expensive access to their cash grants, under
current law, placing these funds in bank accounts may make them
more vulnerable to garnishment by creditors. Generally, TANF funds
are exempt from garnishment under state law. However, when
assistance is deposited directly into a bank account, it becomes more
difficult to protect from garnishment because the funds may be
commingled with other money. As a result, when a creditor submits a
garnishment order, the recipient bank may freeze the entire account,
undergo "protracted legal battles" to
often requiring recipients to
23
funds.'
their
to
regain access
3. Electronic Payment Cards
Finally, the latest frontier in public assistance disbursement is the
electronic payment card (EPC), such as the "EPPICard." EPCs are
branded, prepaid debit cards (generally Visa or Mastercard), which can
be used wherever those cards are otherwise accepted. 24 The federal
government has already begun distributing Social Security and
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Supplemental Security Income through EPCs, and most states do the
sam*e for Unemployment Insurance.
Compared to EBT, EPCs provide access to a wider ATM network
and generally enable online purchases. 126 Additionally, funds
deposited onto an EPC are easier to protect from garnishment than
those deposited to a bank account. Some research also indicates that
EPCs are less expensive for states than the EBT system. Some EPC
card issuers have offered the cards to states for free or at a low cost,
since they expect to generate revenue through the "swipe" fees, also
known as interchange fees, charged to retailers. 127 However, this is
subject to change under new rules within the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act establishing interchange fee
28
limits. 1
Also, again, when it comes to TANF, EPCs lack the consumer
protections of a traditional bank account. EPCs that distribute "needstested benefits in a program established under state or local law or
administered by a state or local agency" are exempt from EFTA's
Regulation E. 129 Although many government-issued EPCs used for
TANF appear to adopt these standards voluntarily, there is no
guarantee of consistency. Furthermore, some TANF recipients elect to
have their assistance deposited to a privately-selected prepaid card,
which often have similar benefits to government-issued EPCs, but vary
more widely in terms of costs and protections.
Finally, fees for accessing funds through EPCs can be equivalent
to those encountered by EBT users-and often fees are not adequately
disclosed. Iowa's Visa-branded "Electronic Access Card," for
example, issued by Wells Fargo, only permits one free ATM
withdrawal per month; each additional withdrawal incurs a $1.3530
transaction fee, plus potential out-of-network ATM surcharges.'
Balance inquiries are fifty cents each. 131 In Oklahoma, a FAQ
document about the MasterCard-branded TANF debit card, which is
125 LAUREN K. SAUNDERS & JILLIAN MCLAUGHLIN, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., 2013 SURVEY OF UNEMPLOYMENT PREPAID CARDS: STATES SAVE WORKERS
MILLIONS IN FEES; THUMBS DOWN ON RESTRICTING CHOICE (Jan. 2013).
126
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the default method of disbursement, avoids directly disclosing fees,132
while a similar four-page document about South Dakota's Visabranded 33"ReliaCard" notes only in fine print that "some fees may
apply."1
The consumer benefits of EPCs deserve recognition, particularly as
an increasing number of states are considering transitioning to an EPC
system as their EBT contracts expire. Yet as the National Consumer
Law Center has summarized, a "well-designed prepaid card will be
better than a paper check, but it will rarely be better than direct deposit
for workers 34who have a bank account that they use for their everyday
expenses."'
III.

STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS

As outlined in Part II, states' substantial discretion in administering
their TANF programs has yielded an inconsistent and consequently
inequitable patchwork of eligibility criteria and benefit levels. Further,
some of the impacts of states' policy choices are at cross-purposes
with the program's anti-poverty goals. However, states are also taking
advantage of the program's flexibility to develop innovative strategies
and initiatives to make TANF work better for supporting families'
long-term economic stability. By incorporating asset building and
financial inclusion principles into their benefits delivery, these states
illustrate TANF's unrealized potential to connect families with the
financial mainstream and strengthen their financial capabilities-while
providing evidence for policy changes at the federal level.
A. ConnectingFamilieswith Bank Accounts: Pennsylvania and
Washington
In two states, public-private partnerships are directly addressing a
key component of financial inclusion by connecting TANF families
with free or low-cost basic bank accounts.
132
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In Pennsylvania, the Center for Hunger Free Communities at
Drexel University recently launched a highly innovative pilot program
in Philadelphia that will provide TANF participants with matched
savings accounts, financial education, and peer support and affinity
groups. The "Building Wealth and Health Network," as the pilot is
called, aims to "develop a peer-oriented, asset-building model that
helps women break the cycle of poverty" in the short-term; the longterm objective is "to develop a model of public
assistance that could
'' 35
transform the United States welfare system."
The initial 18-month pilot will consist of a randomized control
study with a total of ninety participants divided into three groups. Two
groups will have access to the matched savings accounts and financial
literacy classes, but only one will receive the peer-support component.
The third group will be a control group. All the groups will receive
baseline and biannual surveys, in order to assess effectiveness of the
program. To be eligible, participants must commit to saving $5 per
week, which will receive a 100% match, enabling families to save up
to $520 per year. For the first six months, funds in the accounts will be
frozen, but afterwards their use is unrestricted. The Center is
developing a unique 18-month curriculum designed for households
with very little income, for the participant groups required to attend
financial education courses.
The accounts themselves are made possible through a partnership
with a local credit union, American Heritage, which has agreed to
provide free savings accounts for each participant. The accounts have
a $15 minimum balance requirement, though the credit union has
agreed to let participants gradually accumulate this amount through
weekly deposits. Participants have to complete an application, but the
credit union is prepared to accommodate clients with less than perfect
banking history; it already offers "Fresh Start" accounts for individuals
in similar circumstances. 1 36 Additionally, the consent form for the
accounts includes a notice about garnishment. Participants will receive
ATM cards and have access to online banking. They will also have the
opportunity to make deposits during their financial literacy classes, at
which representatives from the credit union will be present. This
... CTR. FOR HUNGER FREE COMMUNITIEs, Building Wealth and Health
Network:
A
Microfinance
Demonstration
Project,
http://www.centerforhungerfreecommunities.org/our-projects/building-wealth-andhealth-network-microfinance-demonstration-project (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
136 Interview with Rachel Kirzner & Nijah Newton-Famous, Ctr. for Hunger
Free Communities (Feb. 6, 2014).

design feature will help participants circumvent a structural barrier to
financial inclusion: inadequate access to bank branches in low-income
neighborhoods.
In Washington, an organization called the Prosperity Agenda has
partnered with the Department of Commerce to connect participants in
the state's subsidized employment program, Community Jobs (CJ),
with no-cost bank accounts and financial education. CJ provides
participants in the state's TANF program, WorkFirst, with up to six
months of paid part-time, temporary employment, combined with
intensive case management to resolve employment barriers and an
additional ten hours a week on "activities to increase
employability."' 137 Rather than a TANF grant, participants receive the
minimum wage for their work hours, up to $796 per month.
The Community Jobs Asset Pilot Program emerged after the state
legislature passed a bill in 2011 requiring state agencies to develop
strategies "to increase opportunities for public assistance recipients to
maintain bank accounts, with a goal of increasing recipient financial
literacy and financial management skills and minimizing recipient
38
costs association with automatic teller machine transaction fees."'
The pilot, which is currently underway at one rural site and one urban
site, will educate participants about direct deposit and the benefits of
having a bank account; identify and reduce participants' barriers to
banking through appropriate referrals; connect those who are
interested with a no-fee bank account, which will receive direct
deposit of their CJ wages; and provide financial education. Participants
also have the option of selecting a well-designed prepaid card in lieu
of a bank account, although bank accounts are presented as the
primary and preferred option.
Both the Washington and Pennsylvania pilots are exciting and
commendable first steps toward promoting financial inclusion through
TANF. However, the impact of each is currently limited by resource
constraints and policy barriers. For example, Pennsylvania maintains a
TANF asset limit of $1,000 per household-the lowest limit in the
nation. Even if the pilot program is successful in providing a
mechanism for saving and instilling a savings habit, participants who
continue to save beyond the pilot will quickly risk compromising their
eligibility. This state policy choice undermines the potential of the
pilot effort.
137 Community Jobs Asset Pilot Program Design (draft) (June 10, 2013) (on
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Similarly, in Washington, although the pilot itself is still in
process, the differing experiences at the urban and rural sites already
impart some important lessons about the types of resources necessary
to craft a successful financial inclusion effort within a TANF program.
Most notably, at the rural pilot, all of the case managers are also
trained as financial coaches, which makes them much more confident
in providing financial trainings and advice. There is also a dedicated
AmeriCorps volunteer helping to manage the pilot. Furthermore,
applicants at the rural location are provided with a group orientation
with the CJ manager, who takes care to explain the benefits of the pilot
and the relationship between financial inclusion and overcoming other
barriers. Finally, unlike the urban location, the rural location has
access to a computer lab where participants can participate in financial
literacy and management activities. Due to all of these factors, the
rural pilot has experienced a higher take-up rate and is expected39 to
reach the goal of a hundred participants before the pilot concludes.'
The Washington pilots also illustrate the challenges of connecting
TANF participants to appropriate accounts on a large scale. Though
pilot organizers originally envisioned automatically enrolling all CJ
participants in free bank accounts provided by the state's EBT
contractor, JP Morgan Chase, this feature exceeded the scope of the
existing contract. Instead, once participants in the pilot complete the
financial management classes, they are provided with a certificate to
take to a financial institution participating in the Bank On program.
Bank On is a national network of partnerships between state and local
governments and financial institutions, designed to increase access to
free or low-cost accounts among unbanked households. Due to varying
degrees of buy-in and inconsistent account standards, 40 Bank On has
met with mixed success since its inception, which signals that, in its
current form, it may not be the ideal solution for unbanked TANF
households. More fundamentally, behavioral economics instructs us
that requiring individuals to take action and make a choice among
banks and accounts will decrease participation
compared to what it
41
enrollment.'
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•In sum, the efforts in both Washington and Pennsylvania offer
important lessons for state and federal policy-but both have been
made possible largely through the dedication of local advocacy
organizations and partnerships with mission-driven financial
institutions. Taking these efforts to scale will require greater buy-in
and resources from both government and the financial sector.
B. FacilitatingProductive Client Choices: Vermont and Wisconsin
Several states have incorporated practices directly into their
administrative code or procedures that facilitate financial inclusion and
informed financial decision-making. Vermont, for example, informs
clients that their "cash assistance will be deposited directly into your
bank account through direct deposit. If you do not have a bank
142
account, you will receive your cash assistance on an EBT card."'
Similarly, in New Hampshire, the TANF state plan provides that "EBT
is the default method of benefit issuance, unless the case head has a
bank account that accepts direct deposit."' 143 By providing direct
deposit as the primary or default option, these states set families up to
receive their assistance with fewer fees and greater capabilities.
Wisconsin takes a similar approach in its TANF program,
"Wisconsin Works," or "W-2." Wisconsin is unique in that it currently
does not distribute TANF assistance via EBT cards, though the state is
in the process of moving towards implementation of an electronic
method of delivery. Meanwhile, 84% of households receive their W-2
benefits via paper check, while the remaining 16% receive their
assistance through direct
deposit to a bank account or participant44
owned prepaid card.1
Yet despite being among the last to transition from paper checks,
Wisconsin is among the most proactive in championing direct deposit
and educating recipients about the costs and benefits of prepaid cards.
The W-2 manual enumerates the benefits of direct deposit, including
more "safe and timely" payments and the avoidance of check cashing

142 VT. DEP'T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, AGENCY OF HUMAN SERV., Reach
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fees. 145 Further, the manual instructs agencies to discuss various
options with families who have negative banking history, including
"opening a limited account with a debit card only option that does not
allow expenditures in excess of available funds," and connecting these
families with resources "to repair their standing with banks."' 146 Lastly,
for clients who choose to have their W-2 assistance deposited directly
to a privately selected prepaid card, the state requires
that eligibility
47
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Still, even with all of these supportive practices in place, only a
portion of Wisconsin's banked TANF families have their assistance
directly deposited. Approximately 27% of W-2 households have bank
accounts, but only 16% select direct deposit. 148 This disparity speaks
to the complexity of barriers to banking and the need for larger
structural reforms to make mainstream bank accounts work better for
low-income households.
C. Extending ConsumerProtectionsto TANF Families:California
Adequate consumer protections, such as the right to have stolen
funds replaced, are crucial to giving substance to efforts to increase
access to assistance. Yet as previously described, federal protections
for families' TANF benefits are weak to non-existent. To extend these
basic consumer rights to TANF households, states have to take
proactive legislative measures.
California provides an example of the type of proactive approach.
In 2012, the state legislature passed a law to protect EBT cardholders
from theft. 14 9 In 2013, the state took another step forward by enacting
legislation that would extend EFTA's protections to TANF families
choosing to have their benefits deposited onto a privately-selected
prepaid card.150 Finally, in 2014, the California legislature passed a bill
that would establish an array of consumer protections and services for
145
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TANF households, including the ability to report a stolen card and
view transaction histories online; information about how to avoid fees
and surcharges, including by selecting direct deposit; and a notification
system for EBT outages. 151 California already provides a greater
number of transaction fee-free withdrawals than most states, and these
additional measures exemplify the range of options available to states
for ensuring that TANF households have access to equivalent
information
and services as consumers outside of the public assistance
52
system.1

D. Broadening TANF's Definition of Self-Sufficiency
Each of these state and local examples signals the promise of the
public assistance system, and TANF in particular, to serve as a
mechanism for financial inclusion. However, given the nearly singular
focus on work participation rates (WPR) for assessing TANF's
success, 153 states have little incentive to enact these types of measures
on a broader scale unless: (1) states have sufficient evidence that
proactively supporting financial inclusion will increase their TANF
households' ability to obtain and keep employment, or (2) initiatives to
support financial inclusion can count towards a state's WPR.
To the first point, emerging research supports the claim that access
to modest savings and basic financial services supports selfsufficiency, job placement, and retention-and thus furthers TANF's
primary objectives. 154 For example, under both current TANF policy
and prior AFDC rules, employment in even a low-wage job often
abruptly disqualifies a household from cash assistance, while the
...
A.B. 1614 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
152
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program itself prohibits recipients from developing a small pool of
savings to ease their transition; consequently, "newly employed
welfare recipients have difficulty accumulating a cushion of savings to
deal with expenses such as clothes needed for a job, car insurance and
repairs, and emergency child care."' 55 Requiring TANF families to
remain in a state of perpetual economic vulnerability decreases the
likelihood that their transition to employment will be sustainable.
Second, the WPR metric has been subject to significant criticism
by scholars and advocates, primarily because, as the name suggests, it
only tracks participationrather than effectiveness and outcomes, and
largely excludes education and training opportunities that would
increase a participant's long-term earning potential and likelihood of
long-term self-sufficiency. Further, the WPR imposes substantial
administrative costs on states, diverting time that caseworkers could
prospects and
devote to actually improving participants'
circumstances; in Minnesota, one study of employment counselors
found that "they spent 53% of their TANF time.., on documentation
rather than actually helping customers find and keep
activities,
156
jobs."
In July 2012, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
published an Information Memorandum regarding waivers of the
standard TANF work requirements under section 1115 of the Social
Security Act. 157 In particular, the memo explained that HHS was
interested in enabling states "to test alternative and innovative
strategies, policies, and procedures that are designed to improve
employment outcomes for needy families." To date, no state has
successfully applied for a section 1115 waiver since PRWORA was
enacted. 158 However, the waiver itself, and the current administration's
expressed willingness to back more innovative efforts to support
155 Alan M. Hershey & LaDonna A. Pavetti, Turning Job Finders Into Job
Keepers, 7 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 74, 80 (1997) (noting that "[i]n low-benefit states,
almost any job a welfare recipient takes will end her AFDC benefits immediately,
giving her no time at all to build the financial reserve she will need to keep
at
available
working"),
futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/0701-06.pdf.
156 See Statement of Elizabeth Lower-Basch, supra note 153, at 4.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1315; Memorandum from Earl S. Johnson, Director, Office of
Family Assistance, to States Administering TANF, TANF-ACF-IM-2012-03 (July
12, 2012) (guidance concerning waiver and expenditure authority under Section
1115 of the Social Security Act).
158 The Philadelphia pilot project sought a waiver, but the state ultimately
elected not to submit it for approval.

employment outcomes, presents an opportunity for additional largescale exploration of how financial inclusion efforts could be integrated
into TANF programming, as well as further study of how these efforts
influence job access and retention.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATE AND FEDERAL POLICY

Transforming TANF into a mechanism for financial inclusion will
require action at both the state and federal level. Although states have
significant discretion to make policy choices that would support access
to financial services and ensure appropriate safeguards, input,
oversight, and reform at the federal level will be essential for creating
a more equitable policy landscape and consistent set of consumeroriented standards.
A. State Recommendations
1. Raise or Eliminate Asset Limits
Reconceptualizing TANF as a program that supports financial
inclusion and asset building is a long-term process, but a prerequisite
for this shift is the removal of explicit restrictions on saving. As
previously described, placing a low limit on a family's savings and
requiring them to submit to intensive scrutiny of all their resources
prevents these households from building a small pool of savings to
support their resiliency, results in creating households that are illequipped to making a smooth or lasting transition out of assistance,
and deters participation in the financial mainstream by casting a bank
account as a liability.
States have the authority to raise, eliminate, or modify what is
counted towards their TANF asset limits, and each option would be a
notable improvement on the status quo in most parts of the country.
Increasing asset limits to a moderate level, such as $10,000,
technically permits families to build or maintain a modest savings
cushion to help them weather emergencies and transition sustainably
off of assistance. Similarly, excluding certain categories of assets, such
as retirement and educational accounts, permits families to retain
savings for certain long-term purposes even while receiving temporary
assistance. However, neither of these options would noticeably
mitigate the administrative burden of evaluating assets. 159
159 See SPRAGUE & BLACK, supra note 74.

Furthermore, significant paperwork requirements alone have been
found to deter some eligible households from applying and make it
more difficult for eligible applicants to be approved. 160 Lastly, as
previously noted, few low-income families are saving in tax-preferred
restricted accounts because they have little financial incentive to do so.
While well-intentioned, the addition of detailed lists of exceptions to
asset rules adds to the complexity and confusion around asset limits
rather than significantly bolstering opportunities to save.
A more comprehensive reform effort would entail the elimination
of TANF asset limits nationwide. The experience of states that have
already made this policy choice indicates that it will not result in a
significant increase in caseload, particularly since TANF recipients are
subject to time limits and strict work requirements. 161 More
fundamentally, eliminating asset limits is key to the long-term process
of transforming the public assistance system into one that supports and
facilitates saving, rather than actively discourages it.
2. Establish Direct Deposit as Default
One way that states could bolster financial inclusion for their
TANF households is by implementing direct deposit as the default
method of delivery. Behavioral economics has demonstrated that
defaults matter. In the retirement context, for example, automatically
enrolling workers in a workplace retirement plan, with the option to
opt out, has dramatically increased participation and reduced racial and
income-based participation disparities.' 6 To further ensure that this
policy has the intended effect, states could provide financial coaching
to participants to ensure that if they do have a bank account, it is
affordable and serving their needs, rather than burdening them with
significant monthly fees or overdraft "protection." The FDIC's "Safe
160

In Pennsylvania, for example, when the SNAP asset limit was reinstated at

a higher level, the number of applications rejected for insufficient paperwork grew
by over 17,000, while only 0.3% of applicants were found ineligible due to excess
assets. Alfred Lubrano, Thousands of Pennsylvanians Denied Food Stamps When
Tied
to
Assets,
PHIL.
INQUIRER,
May
3,
2013,
available at

http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct-pennsylvania-food-stamp-test-toocomplex.html.
161 See SPRAGUE & BLACK, supra note 74, at 9-10.

162 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and

401(k) Savings Behavior (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8651,
2001); ARIEL EDUC. INITIATIVE & AON HEWITT, 401(K) PLANS IN LIVING COLOR: A
STUDY OF 401(K) SAVINGS DISPARITIES ACROSS RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS

(2012).

if a
Accounts" model can provide a list of criteria for determining
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standards.
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Further, there is precedent for establishing direct deposit as the
default policy for a government benefit. Vermont provides an example
in the TANF context. For Unemployment Insurance, the Department
of Labor has recommended "payment of benefits by direct deposit
rather than debit cards for individuals with bank accounts," and urged
states to "offer the opportunity to elect direct deposit as soon as
possible during the claims process."' 64 A 2013 report from the
National Consumer Law Center found that states' decisions about
these practices had a significant impact:
[T]he differences in direct deposit rates among states
seem primarily to be due to how hard or easy the state
makes it for workers to choose direct deposit. States
that actively encourage enrollment in direct deposit
upon application have high direct deposit rates. States
that put hurdles in front of workers have lower rates.
For example, Arizona's rock bottom direct deposit
rate [ 16%] is clearly due to the fact that the state does
not give workers the initial choice of direct deposit.
Workers are automatically enrolled in the prepaid
card whether they want it or not. After they receive
their card, they must take the initiative to find and fill
out a form to set up direct deposit. The form must be
it cannot be completed online or over
sent in by mail;
65
the phone.'
At core, the same principles can apply to distribution of TANF
assistance. However, since many TANF applicants are unbankedlikely a much higher proportion than UI applicants, since UI is not a
means-tested benefit-a default direct deposit policy alone will have
limited impact. To supplement this intervention, state agencies could
seek to help interested TANF families overcome barriers to banking

163 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC MODEL SAFE ACCOUNTS PILOT: FINAL

REPORT (2012).
164 Letter from Jane Oates, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp't &
Training Admin., to State Workforce Agencies (Aug. 21, 2009), available at
http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL34-09.pdf.
165 SAUNDERS

& MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 125.

and connect them with safe, affordable accounts.166 One way to
accomplish this would be by requiring the EBT contracting financial
institution, via the EBT contract, to provide free or low-cost basic
bank accounts to all TANF participants at enrollment.
3. Negotiate contracts with EBT and prepaid issuers that prioritize
consumers
Third, states must negotiate contracts with EBT and EPC issuers
that prioritize adequate access to benefits, minimal fees and
surcharges, and clear, straightforward information about how and
where to withdraw assistance without a charge. Administering an EBT
or EPC system invariably entails significant costs, but states should
avoid passing these costs onto recipients who are already under
financial distress.
At minimum, states should provide a fast, simple process for
selecting direct deposit, both at initial application and at any
subsequent point; permit a minimum of two free ATM withdrawals
each month (consistent with bi-weekly paychecks), and preferably
more; eliminate fees for balance inquiries or viewing transaction
history; establish standards for ensuring adequate access to surchargefree ATMs; and provide clear and accessible information to
participants about potential fees and how to locate surcharge-free
ATMs.' 67
4. Strengthen protections of electronically deposited TANF benefits
from garnishment
States can take action to provide stronger protections from
garnishment for TANF assistance. Although most states currently
exempt TANF benefits from garnishment, banks that receive
garnishment orders may nevertheless freeze the accounts, thereby
jeopardizing families' access to their limited funds and imposing

166

See KARAN GILL ET AL., PROSPERITY AGENDA, BUILDING FINANCIAL

CAPABILITY: TANF BANK ACCOUNTS (2013), for a more detailed discussion of how
to operationalize this policy.
167 See NEW AM. FOUND., RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR TANF PAYMENT
CONTRACTS
(Apr.
2014),
http://assets.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2014/recommendedstandards_f
CARD

ortanf paymentcard contracts, for more details on these and other best practices.

direct deposit or interacting with the
another deterrent to selecting
68
financial mainstream.'
In 2013, new federal regulations were enacted to strengthen
garnishment protections for federally administered benefits: Social
Security, SSI, and veterans' benefits. The new regulations "requir[e]
financial institutions that receive such a garnishment order to
determine the sum of such Federal benefit payments deposited to the
account during a two month period, and to ensure that the account
holder has access to an amount equal to that sum or to the current
balance of the account, whichever is lower."' 69 In other words, banks
cannot indiscriminately freeze any account for which they receive a
garnishment order and determine subsequently that some funds in the
account were exempt; instead, they must begin by ascertaining if some
portion of the balance is exempt and confirm that it remains available
to the consumer.
Although limited to federal assistance, the new federal regulations
may incidentally bolster protections for state-administered benefits,
since banks will be newly required to conduct an account review that
could facilitate discovery of exempted state deposits. Nevertheless,
states could significantly reinforce these protections by formalizing
similar requirements for TANF and other state-administered benefits
(such as Unemployment Insurance). Currently, many states provide
disclaimers to TANF recipients that although their assistance is
exempt from garnishment, in the event that it is garnished or their
1 70
entire account is frozen, they will need to seek legal assistance.
These types of disclaimers are necessary for ensuring that consumers
are fully informed, but they also convey the message that TANF
households cannot rely on existing consumer protections to be
enforced. This unreliability may deter banking relationships and
consequently contribute to further financial marginalization.
168

See JOHN INFRANCA, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., SAFER THAN THE

MATTRESS? A POLICY TO ENSURE THAT SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER EXEMPT
FEDERAL BENEFITS REMAIN SAFE FROM GARNISHMENT, ATTACHMENT, AND FREEZES

WHEN DEPOSITED INA BANK ACCOUNT (2009), for a description of how garnishment
harms financial security.
169Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 32,099 (May 29, 2013).
170 W-2 Manual, supra note 145 ("Per Wisconsin Statutes Section 49.96, W-2
payments cannot be garnished, however banks must honor garnishment actions
ordered by the court. Agencies must provide this information to W-2 participants
who choose direct deposit of W-2 benefits. If the bank garnishes the W-2 benefits,
the FEP should advise the participant to seek legal assistance to stop the
garnishment.").

5. Limit the Use of ChexSystems to Screening for Past Fraud
Lastly, states can take a proactive role in urging financial
institutions to more narrowly tailor their use of ChexSystems and
similar credit databases to the goal of fraud prevention. Currently,
ChexSystems disproportionately excludes low-income consumers
from mainstream banking services, though often as a result of simple
mistakes rather than the intentional fraud or misconduct these
databases are ostensibly designed to prevent. Further, low-income
consumers are more likely than their higher-income counterparts to be
victims of identity theft, and stand to be doubly victimized if this
experience serves to prevent them from opening a bank account.
In New York, the state Attorney General recently pushed banks
operating within the state to adopt new policies governing their use of
ChexSystems that would only screen for past fraud, rather than
assessing present credit risk. In response, Capital One devised new
standards in partnership with the Attorney General's office, which it
agreed to implement nationwide. 17 This reform will provide a path to
the financial mainstream for hundreds of thousands of Americans, and
sets a precedent for future state-based advocacy to secure more
equitable access to banking services for their residents.
B. FederalRecommendations
1. Index Asset Limits to Inflation and Establish an Asset Limit Floor
Though much of the recent momentum around asset limit reform
has taken place at the state level, federal action is still essential to
creating a more equitable asset limit landscape. Short of eliminating
TANF asset limits, Congress could take a significant step toward
modernizing the program's eligibility criteria by establishing an asset
limit floor and requiring that asset limits be indexed to inflation.
President Obama's FY2011 budget included a legislative proposal
to establish a "national asset limit floor of $10,000 for working age,
non-disabled individuals." This limit would apply to SNAP, TANF,
and the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, although it
would exclude SSI. While the limitations of a floor as opposed to
171

See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman

Announces Commitment by Capital One to Expand Access to Bank Accounts for
Consumers Previously Excluded from the Banking System (June 16, 2014),
available

at

http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-

commitment-capital-one-expand-access-bank-accounts-consumers.

elimination have been previously described, the Obama proposal or a
similar reform would nevertheless support several important
objectives: it would encourage moderate savings rather than penalize
it; it would allow families accessing temporary supports to develop or
maintain a sufficient emergency fund; and it would establish common
standards for eligibility criteria across several programs that serve
similar populations.
2. Establish Best Practices for EBT Contracts
Ultimately, states will need to take the lead in negotiating EBT and
EPC contracts that prioritize consumers. However, this can be a
difficult task when states have limited capacity to research other states'
choices, and often remain unaware that others have negotiated more
advantageous terms. To both increase states' bargaining power and
establish basic standards for fees and access, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), in partnership with the Department of
Health and Human Services, could publish a set of best practices for
EBT contracts. These practices could include many of the elements
described in the previous section. The CFPB could also encourage
more states to partner with financial institutions to connect TANF
households with free or low-cost bank accounts.
3. Extend Regulation E to All Cards Holding TANF Assistance
Third, both EBT cards and all prepaid cards to which TANF
assistance is deposited should be covered by Regulation E, which
implements the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. The CFPB has the
authority to extend Regulation E to prepaid cards, including the
172
EPPICard and other EPCs used by states to administer TANF.
Amending EFTA to remove the "EBT exemption" would require
legislative action. These changes are important for ensuring that all
TANF families, regardless of the methods of benefit delivery available
to them, have the same rights with respect to disclosures, dispute,
recredit, and transaction information.
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Comment on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Electronic Fund Transfers

(Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923 (May 24, 2012) Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/policy2012),
24,
(July
(July 23,
legislation/regulators/Comments-to-CFPB-on-Prepaid-Card-Use.pdf
2012).

4. Clarify That Section 4004 Does Not Apply to Bank Accounts
Finally, the Department of Health and Human Services should
clarify that section 4004 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012, which prohibits TANF recipients from accessing
their assistance at certain ATMs, does not apply to the direct deposit of
TANF assistance into a recipient's bank account or privately selected
prepaid card. Applying section 4004's restrictions to private bank
accounts would be essentially impossible to enforce, while
"[d]iscontinuing direct deposit as an option for TANF recipients would
be an unintended consequence of Section 4004, and would be directly
in conflict with the broader TANF goals of promoting work and selfsufficiency."' 73 Further, implementing a rule that would essentially
disable the direct deposit option for TANF would be at odds with the
federal government's policies regarding other assistance programs, and
thus further single out and marginalize TANF households. 7 HHS was
scheduled to publish a final rule on the implementation of the new
TANF restrictions in March 2015, though it was not yet available at
75
the time of this article's drafting.'
CONCLUSION

While policymakers often disagree on the ideal structure and scope
of the social safety net, the stated goal of such programs is less
controversial: to help families move out of poverty sustainably and
attain financial self-sufficiency. TANF, a program ostensibly designed
to help support poor individuals and families while they navigate this
process, operates in a way that is directly contrary to the goals of the
social safety net. TANF's current policies impose significant barriers
Letter from Elizabeth Lower-Basch, Policy Coordinator, Ctr. on Law &
Soc. Policy, to Robert Shelbourne, Office of Family Assistance, Adm'r for Children
173

& Families (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-

publications/publication- 1/CLASP-comments-on-EBT-restriction-NPRM.pdf.
174 Comment on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Temporary Assistance
for
Needy Families (TANF) State Reporting on Policies and Practices to Prevent Use of
TANF Funds in Electronic Benefit Transfer Transactions in Specified Locations, 79
Fed. Reg. 7,127 (Feb. 6, 2014), Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities (Apr. 21, 2014),

http://www.aphsa.org/content/dam/NASTA/PDF/APHSANASTA%20TANF%20EBT%20Comment%20Letter-Final.pdf.
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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program, State
Reporting On Policies and Practices to Prevent Use of TANF Funds in Electronic
Benefit Transfer Transactions in Specified Locations, 79 Fed. Reg. 7,127 (proposed
Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 262).

to these objectives and often embody outdated anti-poverty strategies
that fail to recognize the importance of savings and access to basic
financial tools for economic mobility. An approach that accounts for
research findings over the last two decades on the important role that
savings and financial inclusion can play in supporting families moving
out of economic marginality would more readily advance the goals of
TANF and other social assistance programs. Such an approach would
not only help families meet their immediate needs but also enable
them to build a path toward the financial mainstream; this pathway
would more readily put long-term financial independence within
reach.
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